ESR
2.1.6.2. The practice of application of provisions of the Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police has been studied, and amendments to the Regulations have been proposed
Problem solving:
2.1.6. Lack of an effective model of appointment to positions, remuneration, career promotion, and review of disciplinary complaints within the system of the National Police
Deadlines for all measures within ESR
01.05.2023 -
31.07.2024
Implementation of SACP measures within ESR
Total number of measures –
9
2
1
6
Implemented
In progress
Not started
Implementation of SACP measures within the scope of the Problem by main main performers
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine
22.2%
9
Summarized general information on Measures
Indicators of achievement of ESR
Total number of indicators – 4
Indicators fully achieved – 0
Partially achieved indicators – 0
Indicators with a score of 0% – 4
Summarized general information about Achievement Indicators
| № | Indicators | Weight (%) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 |
An analytical report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has been published, covering the findings of the study to analyze the effectiveness of application of the provisions of the Disciplinary Regulations of the National Police of Ukraine between 2018 and 2022, specifying (with data grouped separately for junior, middle, and senior positions with the police): a) the total number of internal investigations conducted (3 percent); b) the number of recorded statements, complaints, and reports from citizens, officials, and other police officers, the mass media about offenses committed by police officers showing signs of disciplinary misconduct (3 percent); c) the number of internal investigations based on reports about violations of constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms by police officers (5 percent); d) the number of disciplinary committees that included representatives of the public (3 percent); e) the number of disciplinary sanctions imposed (broken down by kinds of sanctions) (3 percent); f) a description and results of assessment of the most widespread problems relating to the effectiveness and transparency of the procedure by which police officers are brought to disciplinary liability (5 percent); g) the prospects of creation of a disciplinary authority having status as an interregional territorial body of the National Police (3 percent); h) recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness and quality of the procedure of internal investigations and the independence of the work of the disciplinary committee (5 percent). |
30% |
| 2 |
A law has taken effect, which provides for: a) the creation and functioning of two types of permanent independent disciplinary committees tasked with conducting internal investigations into alleged violations of constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms by police officers as well as conducting internal investigations into other disciplinary misconduct by police officers (8 percent); b) ensuring that at least one half of the members of disciplinary committees conducting internal investigations into alleged violations of human and civil rights and freedoms by police officers are reputed and well-known representatives of the human rights organizations and the public, who have an impeccable reputation, high professional and moral qualities, and high standing in society (5 percent); c) mandating that the number and composition of disciplinary committees of the central administrative agency of the police shall be approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs, and the number and composition of disciplinary committees of territorial (including interregional) agencies of the police shall be approved by the Chief of the National Police (4 percent); d) the right of the disciplinary committee to submit—while exercising its powers—queries to agencies (units) of the police, other government agencies, local self-government bodies, and legal entities (irrespective of their form of ownership) and request materials required for the internal investigation; the timeframes, grounds, and forms of disclosure of information by agencies (units) of the police, other government agencies, local self-government bodies, and legal entities to the disciplinary committees, as well as grounds for withholding such information (4 percent); e) prohibition of interference in the activities of disciplinary committees (4 percent); f) mandating that the conclusion of the disciplinary committee based on the findings of the internal investigation shall be approved by the chairperson of the committee (4 percent); g) obligating the supervisor of the police officer, who is authorized to impose a disciplinary penalty, to be guided by the conclusion of the disciplinary committee when deciding whether or not to impose the penalty, and where the supervisor objects to this conclusion he or she shall substantiate this decision in writing and send the conclusion and the materials of the internal investigation to the person who is authorized to approve the membership of the disciplinary committee, and this person shall decide whether or not to impose the disciplinary sanction (4 percent); h) the mechanism by which a police officer can appeal the decision to impose a disciplinary penalty on him or her (4 percent); i) the attributes and list of kinds of disciplinary misconduct by police officers, which violate constitutional human and civil rights and freedoms and for which the disciplinary committee can impose a disciplinary penalty, including dismissal from the position while remaining in the police force or dismissal from service in the police force (4 percent); j) amendments taking into account the recommendations on ways to improve the effectiveness and quality of work of police committees and the selection procedure issued based on the findings of the study indicated in subclause 1 of clause 2.1.6.2 (4 percent). |
45% |
| 3 |
Normative legal acts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been aligned with the law indicated in subclause 2 of clause 2.1.6.2. |
15% |
| 4 |
the results of the expert survey have demonstrated that: a) more than 75 percent of experts on the activities of law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities evaluate the quality of legal regulation implemented following the enactment of the law indicated in subclause 2 of clause 2.1.6.2 as high or very high (10 percent); b) more than 50 percent of experts on the activities of law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities evaluate the quality of legal regulation implemented following the enactment of the law indicated in subclause 2 of clause 2.1.6.2 as high or very high (7 percent); c) more than 25 percent of experts on the activities of law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities evaluate the quality of legal regulation implemented following the enactment of the law indicated in subclause 2 of clause 2.1.6.2 as high or very high (3 percent). |
10% |